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The purpose of this study was to develop and test the reliability and validity of a new scale
designed for measuring safety climate among lone workers, using truck drivers as exem-
plar. The new scale employs perceived safety priority as the metric of safety climate and
a multilevel framework, separating the measurement of organization- and group-level
safety climate. The second purpose of this study was to compare the predictive power of
generic items with trucking industry-speciﬁc ones. Three dimensions for each of the two
levels of safety climate were drawn from the results. The organization-level safety climate
dimensions were proactive practices, driver safety priority, and supervisory care promo-
tion. The group-level safety climate dimensions were safety promotion, delivery limits,
and cell phone disapproval. Predictive validity of both generic and industry-speciﬁc items
was supported, but the industry-speciﬁc items provided a stronger predictive value.
Results showed that the scale is a reliable and valid instrument to measure the essential
elements of safety climate for truck drivers in the lone working situation.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
1.1. Safety climate
Safety climate refers to workers’ shared perception of their organization’s policies, procedures, and practices as they re-
late to the value and importance of safety within the organization (Grifﬁn & Neal, 2000; Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2011, in press).
Characterized by shared perceptions of employees, safety climate can be seen as an organization’s temporal ‘‘state of safety’’
at a discrete point in time (Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, & Tomas, 1998). Safety climate is often confused with safety culture and,
while they are similar concepts, they are distinguished in the literature. Safety culture has been described as shared values
and beliefs that interact with an organization’s structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms (Reason, 1998;
Thompson et al., 1996; Utall, 1983). As just stated, safety climate refers to the workers’ shared perceptions of the organiza-
tion’s policies, procedures, and practices as they relate to the value and importance of safety within the organization. In
short, safety climate is the measurable aspect of safety culture. The practical and theoretical signiﬁcance of safety climate
as a construct stems from its ability to predict safety behavior and safety-related outcomes (e.g., accidents and injuries)ioral Sciences, Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety, 71 Frankland Road, Hopkinton, MA 01748,
tual.com (Y.-h. Huang).
BY-NC-ND license.
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2004; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Grifﬁn & Neal, 2000; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Niska-
nen, 1994; Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, & Cox, 2002; Siu, Phillips, & Leung, 2004; Zohar, 1980, 2000). The results of several recent
meta-analysis studies covering up to 202 published studies (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010; Christian, Bradley, Wal-
lace, & Burke, 2009; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011) indicate that safety climate is among the strongest predictors of
safety behaviors and injury data in both workgroups and entire companies.
1.2. The need for studying safety climate for lone workers using truck drivers as exemplar
1.2.1. Lone workers
A lone worker is an employee who works alone and who performs an activity that is intended to be carried out in isolation
from other workers, without close or direct supervision (BSIA, 2010, Hughes & Ferrett, 2009). There is no single deﬁnition
that encompasses those who may face lone working situations. The National Health Service in the United Kingdom (NHS,
2005) deﬁnes lone working as: ‘‘any situation or location in which someone works without a colleague nearby; or when
someone is working out of sight or earshot of another colleague.’’ The term ‘‘lone worker’’ can describe a wide variety of staff
who work, either regularly or occasionally, on their own, without access to immediate support from work colleagues, man-
agers, or others (e.g., telecommuters, truck drivers, travelling salesmen, health visitors; NHS, 2005).
While the number of studies on safety climate has increased dramatically in recent years (Huang, Chen, & Grosch, 2010),
most have focused on traditional work environments, in which supervisors and workers interact under the same roof
throughout the day. Little research has been done to examine how a company’s safety climate inﬂuences lone workers. Given
that lone working is becoming more and more prevalent across a variety of industries (e.g., truck drivers, utility workers,
teleworkers), it is important to conceptualize the effect of this work environment on organizational climate emergence.
1.2.2. High accident rate in trucking industry
The truck accident/crash rate is high. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (BLS, 2012) re-
ported 396 fatalities in truck transportation in 2010 with a rate of 31.8 per 100,000 workers. This accounts for nearly 8.7% of
all work-related fatalities and occurs at an incidence rate much higher than the 3.6 per 100,000 workers seen for all indus-
tries. The non-fatal injury rate in 2010 was 5.3 per 100 full-time workers for truck transportation, compared to a rate of 2.9
for all private industries (BLS, 2012). The workers in the transportation industry in the US experience some of the highest
numbers and rates of fatal and non-fatal injuries. Moreover, the accidents or crashes not only involve trucks but also pas-
senger or other commercial vehicles. The National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration (NHTSA) of the United States
Department of Transportation reported a total of 3380 fatalities and 74,000 injuries involving large trucks in 2009 (NHTSA,
2010). This study conducted research with lone workers using truck drivers as exemplar.
1.2.3. Safety climate issues in trucking industry
Individual workers and their supervisors must make daily decisions about safety at work because it inﬂuences or com-
petes with other performance facets of the job. These can be related to the task itself (e.g., safety vs. on-time delivery or pro-
ductivity), or to the worker performing the task (e.g., safety vs. personal discomfort or extra effort). This situation is
especially evident in industries like transportation/trucking in which employees spend much of their time away from home
base. Truck drivers, who drive alone for long periods on the road, often face competing demands on safe driving, such as on-
time demands vs. taking time to address fatigue, challenging weather conditions, hours of service regulations, proper vehicle
maintenance, and speed limits and other trafﬁc rules. This type of worker rarely has contact with other company drivers and
often lacks direct supervisory interaction, other than through electronic technology. This would seem to make shared per-
spectives on company safety climate difﬁcult to achieve and its existence worth studying.
From the safety climate literature, research shows that individuals are able to form relatively homogenous perceptions
from the vast array of stimuli present in the work environment. Schneider and Reichers (1983) described three approaches
in terms of the etiology of climates (structural approach, attraction–selection–attrition approach, and symbolic interactionist ap-
proach), which could ﬁnd application in the lone-worker situation.
The structural approach to the etiology of climates (Payne & Pugh, 1976) focuses on objective aspects of the work context
affecting workers’ attitudes, values, and perceptions of safety. Examples of objective aspects related to safety include a com-
pany’s training programs, the power/authority of safety managers, types of technology (in-vehicle computers, equipment,
and maintenance) used, and the degree to which safety rules and policies constrain individual behavior. Considering this ap-
proach, the work context may inﬂuence individuals’ safety climate perceptions. In a lone-worker situation, truck drivers in
this case may form their safety climate perception based on objective aspects of the company (e.g., whether good safety
training is provided, how well the truck is maintained).
From the perspective of the ‘‘attraction–selection–attrition’’ approach (Schneider, 1987), workers are similar to each other
and therefore share similar perceptions and interpretations regarding safety (Schneider, 1975). Members of one organization
are relatively homogeneous as a result of organizational processes (e.g., selection into the organization) and individual pro-
cesses (e.g., attraction to and attrition from the organization). Although workers may not be involved in the selection process
(i.e., how trucking companies recruit drivers), it is expected that when a company really cares about and promotes safety, it
will attract and retain workers who really care about safety and who will follow safety rules. Lone workers who care about
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versely, leave if safety is neglected.
The symbolic interactionist perspective (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar, 2010) suggests that climate develops as
workers compare pieces of information and cues, discuss possible interpretations, and attempt to reach a consensus regard-
ing the meaning of events, procedures and practices at the workplace. It places the focus on those meanings that arise from
the interaction between people. According to Blumer (1969) and Mead (1934), verbal communication and other behaviors
leading to social interactions between people are the primary ways meaning and signiﬁcance come to be associated with
membership in a group. Due to reduced face-to-face interactions, this approach may apply to lone workers the least, but they
may still have opportunities to interact with their supervisors, trainers, and others using electronics or the telephone.
Despite the importance of safety climate, there have been only a limited number of published studies that address this
issue in the trucking industry. Arboleda, Morrow, Crum, and Shelley (2003) provided insight into how accidents in the truck-
ing industry might be reduced by a clearer understanding of how common management practices contribute to safety cli-
mate, and the extent to which perceptions of these practices differ as a function of hierarchical level within trucking ﬁrms.
The authors developed a four-item scale to estimate safety climate; however, no validity information was provided for the
scale, and no injury/safety outcomes were examined in the study. They assumed that implementation of a stronger safety
climate should result in fewer accidents, but empirical evidence supporting their assumption was not presented. Wills, Wat-
son, and Biggs (2006) examined the relationship between safety climate and self-reported driving behaviors. The six safety
climate dimensions studied (i.e., communication and procedures, work pressures, relationships, safety rules, driver training,
and management commitment) were signiﬁcantly associated with the four aspects of self-reported driving outcomes (i.e.,
trafﬁc violations, driver error, driving while distracted, and pre-trip vehicle maintenance). However, the focus of their study
was on drivers who needed to drive a motor vehicle at least once during the course of their average work week, not on truck
drivers in the lone working situation.
Unlike traditional studies in the transportation industry that focus on equipment and driver behavior, the current study
extends the safety climate literature to examine the organizational impact (safety climate) on both subjective and objective
safety outcomes for truck drivers (e.g., driving safety, near misses, and road injury). Speciﬁcally, this study focuses on com-
mercial truck drivers who constitute a unique group of lone workers as they drive alone for long periods of time. As Zohar
(2010) suggested, development of industry-speciﬁc climate scales should be encouraged as it is likely to identify new, con-
text-dependent targets of climate perception in respective industries. The identiﬁcation of concrete climate indicators in
each industry should offer opportunities for developing and testing hypotheses regarding processes underlying climate
emergence (Zohar, 2010). It can also be anticipated that the results would provide more actionable and speciﬁc suggestions
for future intervention because these scales are grounded in a particular context. Therefore, the ﬁrst objective of this study
was to develop and test the reliability and validity of a new scale designed for measuring safety climate among lone workers,
using truck drivers as exemplar.
1.3. The conceptual framework of safety climate measure
Following three decades of safety climate research, Zohar (2008, 2010) introduced several propositions for future safety
climate study. Development of the new safety climate scale in the current study was based on three propositions: safety pri-
ority as the requisite referent or target of safety climate perceptions, a multi-level framework for safety climate perceptions,
and organizational climate as socially shared perceptions (Christian et al., 2009; Zohar, 2010). The latter proposition was
subjected to test in this study, given that the context of lone work was expected to impede or obstruct emergence of socially
shared cognitions, giving rise to individual-level climate perceptions.
The Social Ecological Model (Bronfenbrenner, 1977, 1979) can be applicable to this study because it is a multi-level the-
oretical framework that posits there are different spheres of inﬂuence. Those spheres include the microsystem, in which
individuals are shaped by their environment and the people with whom they interact. Like the social interactionist perspec-
tive used in the etiology of climate, social interactions occurring within microsystems have an effect on people. The meso-
system involves the inﬂuence of organizational factors (e.g., policies and rules) on the environment in which individuals live
and work. The examination of mesosystems through the perception of employees is the basis of safety climate research.
1.3.1. Relative priority and multi-level framework for safety climate
Zohar (2008) offers a concise description about relative priority of safety as a target of safety climate perceptions as fol-
lows: ‘‘Given that safety issues often compete with other operational issues such as speed or ﬂow of production, it follows
that (enforced) safety policies and procedures can be construed in terms of the relative priorities of safety and the other pro-
duction goals’’ (p. 377). Methodologically, such a framework suggests that measures of safety climate ought to include items
referring to situations presenting competing operational demands involving safety (e.g., safety vs. speed, ﬂow, schedules,
proﬁtability), because such situations offer the clearest indication of priorities at the workplace.
Zohar (2008, 2010) also proposed that safety climate should be understood within a multi-level framework that identiﬁes
organization- and group-level safety climates as distinct perceptions having different referent objects. To reduce conceptual
ambiguity stemming from the fact that current deﬁnitions and measures fail to discriminate between the priorities of senior
management and those of group supervisors, both organization- and group-level items need to be assessed to attain a com-
prehensive understanding of safety climate. A multi-level framework and related data indicate that employees discriminate
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Therefore, perceptions must be measured separately for the organization- and group-level safety climates. The organiza-
tion-level safety climate refers to perceptions about the instituted company procedures and top-management actions for
promotion of safety, whereas the group-level safety climate involves perceptions about the direct supervisory and work-
group practices for safety. These two different levels of safety climate can be quite independent (i.e., high organization-level
safety climate with low group-level safety climate or vice versa), though they are likely to be related to one another in many
cases. In line with these two propositions, the new scale developed in the current study employs perceived safety priority as
the metric of safety climate and a multi-level framework, separating the measurement of organization- and group-level
safety climate by differentiating items into two sub-scales.
1.3.2. Shared safety climate perception
Christian et al. (2009) categorized safety climate perceptions into two levels of analysis, resulting in shared group-level
safety climate and individual/psychological safety climate. They summarized the literature (e.g., James, Hater, Gent, & Bruni,
1978; James & Sells, 1981; Jermier, Gaines, & McIntosh, 1989; Young, 2010) and deﬁned psychological safety climate as indi-
vidual perceptions about safety-related policies, practices, and procedures pertaining to safety matters that affect personal
well-being at work. A shared group-level safety climate emerges when individual worker’s perceptions are shared and con-
sensus forms within a particular work environment (e.g., James, James, & Ashe, 1990; Young, 2010). Thus, shared group-level
safety climate can be deﬁned as shared perceptions about the work environment and characteristics as they are related to
safety matters that may affect a group of individuals (e.g., Grifﬁn & Neal, 2000; Young, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Due to the
fact that this study involved lone workers who rarely interact with other co-workers, we tested the homogeneity of safety
climate perceptions to determine whether it should be analyzed at the group/work unit or individual levels of analysis.
1.4. The predictive power of generic vs. industry-speciﬁc items
The development of the safety climate scales in this study began with a number of generic items from Zohar and Luria
(2005) that can be applied across industries and are relevant to key safety issues of the lone worker (e.g., trucking industry).
Additionally, new items tailored speciﬁcally to the trucking industry were developed and included in the overall safety cli-
mate scales. As Zohar (2010) stated, although it is possible to use generic safety climate scales across industries, focusing on
the core themes of managerial commitment and safety management, the identiﬁcation of concrete climate indicators in each
industry should offer opportunities for eliciting and testing hypotheses regarding processes underlying climate emergence.
Therefore, the second objective of this study was to compare the predictive power of generic items with industry-speciﬁc
ones, constituting the new Trucking Safety Climate scale. The construct and predictive validities of the newly developed
safety climate scales for the trucking industry were tested. Speciﬁcally, incremental predictive validity of the trucking indus-
try-speciﬁc items over the generic safety climate scale items was examined.
2. Study design/methodology
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed to design the safety climate scales for the trucking industry.
Target participants were corporate lone truck drivers. Informed consent was prepared for each stage of the process, using
speciﬁc consent forms for the individual interviews, cognitive interviews, pilot tests, and actual survey data collection stages.
Study procedures at each stage were approved by the appropriate Institutional Review Board.
2.1. Initial survey question development
Initial survey questions were designed by the project team based on: (a) Review of scientiﬁc literature that led to the
adoption of generic safety climate scale items from Zohar and Luria (2005) – 6 items each for organization- and group-level
safety climate were included in the survey; (b) Review of accident inquiries, which included truck companies’ safety perfor-
mance metrics, such as injury rate, crash rate, and safety audit and risk scores; and (c) Input from subject matter experts,
including truck drivers, supervisors of truck drivers, and insurance experts on the trucking industry. Fifty-three in-depth
interviews were conducted with corporate lone truck drivers and their supervisors at two truck stops and one large trucking
company. Combining the information from all of the above, we decided to focus on job functions, communication patterns,
work priorities, supervisory interactions, and related workplace safety practices. Initial survey development followed and a
draft of potential safety climate items was compiled. A draft of 100 items (61 items for the organization- and 39 items for the
supervisor/group-level safety climate scales) was developed.
2.2. Pre-testing process
2.2.1. Cognitive/think-aloud interviews
Cognitive/think-aloud interviews with 38 truck drivers were conducted to examine the meaning of the items (for clari-
ﬁcation purposes), identify language and/or content issues while completing the questionnaire (e.g., long pauses, inconsis-
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dure was used to improve content validity and face validity. Participants were recruited from two truck stops and one truck-
ing company where interviews for initial item generation were held. Revisions were made for such things as item wording,
presentation order in the survey, and format of the survey based on participants’ comments and suggestions. The revised
scales after cognitive interviews included 35 items measuring organization-level and 26 items measuring group-level safety
climate. The revised scales were used for the next pre-test step.
2.2.2. Pre-test
After the cognitive interviews, the pre-test was conducted with 64 additional truck drivers who were recruited from truck
stops to participate in a paper-and-pencil survey. These pre-tests were conducted to make sure the questions were clear, and
the survey administration was feasible (e.g., estimating the survey completion time). After this stage, the survey was revised.
A 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) was used for all safety climate items.
2.3. Survey implementation at pilot trucking company
The revised version of the survey (i.e., 35 items to measure organization-level and 26 items to measure group-level safety
climate) was completed by drivers working for the pilot company, resulting in 2030 completed surveys. With ofﬁcial per-
mission from the company, the procedure was as follows: when the pilot company held its regular winter training, which
was a 15-min web-based course required for every truck driver of the company, the survey was offered in conjunction with
this program. At the end of the training session, drivers were invited to participate in this survey. Any driver who agreed to
participate had to click the link to enter into a third-party website, which hosted the survey. Consent was given by the driv-
ers during the recruitment. Their participation in the survey was double-blinded; the company did not know who partici-
pated and did not have access to the survey data. In order to link the survey information to future driving outcomes,
participants were asked to enter their company ID to be used as an identiﬁer. Average time for completion of the survey
was 18 min. Five $100 gift cards were provided through a random drawing as an incentive to encourage participation. For
this, the respondents who wished to join the drawing were asked to provide contact information (e.g., e-mail) at the end
of the survey and were assured of their conﬁdentiality again.
Six months after survey completion, performance data from all company drivers were provided to us from the pilot com-
pany to serve as criteria for validating the survey. No names were provided and only the employee IDs were used to link the
information. The survey results were matched with performance data at the individual level. Once this was done, a new set
of identiﬁcation numbers was assigned to replace the employee IDs, which were then dropped out of the dataset to ensure
the conﬁdentiality of survey participants.
2.4. Survey implementation at seven additional companies
After data collection from the pilot company, seven additional trucking companies were recruited and data were collected
from them. A total of 8095 truck drivers took the survey from the eight companies. One company used a paper-and-pencil
survey (the response rate could not be calculated), while the other seven companies used a web-based survey. Response
rates ranged from 34% to 73% with a mean around 45%. Table 1 shows the response rates and other descriptive information
about the eight companies that was acquired from trucking company representatives and trucking websites. Five companies
were classiﬁed as ‘‘Truckloads.’’ That is, they generally contract an entire trailer load to a single customer, as opposite to
‘‘Less-than truckload’’ which generally mixes freight from several customers in each trailer (see Table 1). Only one of the
eight companies was unionized. The percentage of female truckers was as low as .5% and as high as 15% across the eight
companies. The speed limit policy differed across the eight companies from 55 to 68 miles per hour. Individual surveys with
more than 50% missing values in the safety climate scale items were deleted; accordingly, 7466 questionnaires were used for
analysis, including the pilot company data (n = 1998).Table 1
Descriptive information of the eight trucking companies.
Company Aa B C D E F G H
Number of respondents 2030 248 461 290 4003 235 270 558
Response rate (web-based survey) 34% 73% 37% 58% 51% 40% N/A 55%
Descriptive informationb
Truckload or Less-than truckloadc TL LTL TL LTL TL TL LTL TL
Union (U) or Non-Union (N) N N N N N N U N
% Female 7% .5% 8% 3% 3% 15% .4% 2%
Speeding policy 60 mph Local 60 mph 65 mph 63 mph 55 mph 68 mph 63 mph
a Pilot company used to aid in developing and testing of survey.
b Information collected from company representatives and trucking websites.
c TL = Truckload, which generally contracts an entire trailer load to a single customer. LTL = Less-than truckload, which generally mixes freight from
several customers in each trailer.
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All responses for items with negative wordings were reversely coded. Both Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA; with the
data collected from the pilot company) and Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (CFA; ﬁrst with the pilot company, then the full
merged dataset from all eight companies) were performed to provide information for the factorial validity.
The EFA was performed only with the data collected from the pilot company to explore the factorial structure of the new-
ly developed Trucking Safety Climate scales, which also included generic items. Out of 2030 participants, 1998 question-
naires with no more than 50% missing values on the safety climate scales were used. The EFA addresses research
questions that include the following: (a) How many ﬁrst-order factors exist in organization- and group-level safety climate
scales? (b) Do ‘‘within factor’’ items cluster well together while discriminating between items of different factors? and (c)
Which features are most important in the classiﬁcation of a group of items? (DeCoster, 1998). Based on the ﬁndings from
the EFA, the initial item set was trimmed down and reﬁned to form both organization- and group-level safety climate scales.
Internal consistency among items associated with each of the obtained factors was assessed based on Cronbach’s a esti-
mates. Items that decreased sub-scale reliability were dropped. After the EFA and reliability test on internal consistency, 20
items to measure organization-level and 20 items to measure supervisor/group-level safety climate were chosen as the ﬁnal
scale items.
The CFA came after to conﬁrm the construct validity of the safety climate scales. A series of CFAs were performed ﬁrst
with the data collected from the pilot company and then with the data from all eight trucking companies to assure factor
structure validity of the safety climate scales. The quality of the model ﬁt was examined based on comparative ﬁt index
(CFI), Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). For CFI and TLI, .95 or greater is inter-
preted as evidence of appropriate ﬁt (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The guidelines for interpreting RMSEA are as follows: RMSEA < .05
indicates a good model ﬁt; .05 < RMSEA < .08 indicates a reasonable model ﬁt; and RMSEA > .10 indicates a poor model ﬁt
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).
2.6. Examining shared safety climate perception
Within-group agreement and reliability indices such as rwgj, Intra-class Correlation Coefﬁcient ICC(1) and ICC(2) (Bartko,
1976; Bliese, 2000; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984, 1993) were calculated to examine employees’ shared perceptions at the
same work unit level. The criteria for individual-level data aggregation to create group-level variables were as follows:
(1) ICC(1): The ICC(1) indicates the extent to which individuals within the same organization assign the same psycholog-
ical meaning to, or agree in their perceptions of, an organizational characteristic (Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993). There are
no deﬁnitive guidelines on acceptable ICC(1) values. In past research, ICC(1) values have ranged from 0 to 0.50, with a
median of 0.12 (James, 1982; Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993). Perhaps the most widely accepted criterion for ICC(1) is over
0.10, which indicates ICC(1) with medium effect size (Murphy & Myors, 1998).
(2) ICC(2): The ICC(2) assesses the relative status of between and within variability using the average ratings of respon-
dents within each unit (Bartko, 1976). It indicates reliability at the aggregate level, or the reliability of means (Ostroff
& Schmitt, 1993). There is no strict standard of acceptability of ICC(2) values. Glick (1985) recommended an ICC(2)
minimum cutoff of 0.60. Schneider, White, and Paul (1998) suggested that a moderate value of ICC(2) coupled with
an acceptable rwgj score is sufﬁcient grounds for aggregation. The average ICC(2) value for their study was 0.47. LeBr-
eton and Senter (2008) suggested that, depending on the quality of the measures being used in the multi-level anal-
ysis, researchers will probably want to choose values between 0.70 and 0.85 to justify aggregation. One of the most
widely accepted criterion for ICC(2) is over 0.70 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008; Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993).
(3) rwgj: The rwgj is an assessment of within-group inter-rater agreement (James et al., 1993). It measures agreement
among raters’ assessments of a single target. A median of rwgj larger than 0.70 was used as the criterion.
2.7. Measure of safety criteria
Both subjective and objective safety criteria were obtained to test whether the safety climate scores were associated with
the self-reported driving safety behavior and the objective safety outcomes collected.
2.7.1. Subjective safety criterion
To evaluate the participating truck drivers’ self-reported driving safety behavior, six items adapted from Huang, Roetting,
McDevitt, Melton, and Smith (2005) were included in the survey: ‘‘I always comply with the posted speed limits,’’ ‘‘I occa-
sionally jump to get out of my truck quickly,’’ ‘‘I occasionally drive without getting enough sleep,’’ ‘‘I sometimes ﬁnd myself
in a difﬁcult situation without having a way out,’’ ‘‘I always use my log book legally,’’ and ‘‘When I’m tired or rushed, I some-
times skip the daily vehicle inspection.’’ The items were all on a 5-point Likert scale; Cronbach’s a for these six items was
0.66 with data from all eight trucking companies (n = 7466). The average score of these six items was used as the indicator
of this construct. Univariate and multiple regressions were used to investigate the safety climate and safety behavior
relationship.
Y.-H. Huang et al. / Transportation Research Part F 17 (2013) 5–19 112.7.2. Objective safety criteria
Since the measure of driving safety behavior was based on respondents’ self-reports, a socially desirable response ten-
dency could be expected and this might compromise the validity of the measure. To address this concern, objective safety
data were collected to serve as criteria for predictive validity testing. Hard-braking and road injury were the two objective
safety criteria. The frequency of hard-braking for individual drivers was collected because it can presumably represent the
frequency of near misses for truck drivers. Hard-braking is very dangerous as it can be a major cause of collisions and jack-
kniﬁng (the folding of an articulated vehicle such as a truck with a trailer). Another objective safety criterion, road injury, was
operationalized as lost work days due to injury and was measured 6 months after the survey implementation. One notable
advantage of using the road injury variable is that it can convey comprehensive information about safety outcomes unlike
simple accident or injury frequency, which does not take into account the severity, fatality, or overall cost of incidents. Since
an ordinary least-square regression cannot address count variables as dependent variables, a Poisson log-link generalized
linear modeling (GLM) approach was used to estimate the model of safety climate score(s) as independent variable(s)
and an objective performance metric as a dependent variable that was a count variable.
3. Results
Of the total 8095 data points, 7466 responses (92.3%) with no more than 50% missing values on safety climate scales were
retained for further analyses. This included 1998 samples from the pilot company. Only one company provided the hard-
braking frequency data for its participants (3233 participants out of 3578 participant surveys used for analysis, 90.4%), while
road injury data were collected from ﬁve companies (5534 participants out of 6346 participant surveys used for analysis,
87.2%).
3.1. Construct validity
The EFA with a varimax rotation yielded three factors each for the organization- and group-level safety climate scales (i.e.,
proactive practices, driver safety priority, and supervisory care promotion for the organization-level safety climate scale; safety
promotion, delivery limits, and cell phone disapproval for the group-level safety climate scale). Although we anticipated these
potential factors to be somehow correlated, we also assumed that these factors would stand independently; therefore, we
chose varimax rotation. Based on the factor structure, factor loading, and content validity, 20 items for each of the organi-
zation- and group-level scales were selected. Items with multiple loading and relatively weak factor loading (less than 0.45)
were dropped out. At the same time, theoretical and practical aspects of the items were also considered. For instance, the
item ‘‘My supervisor expects me to answer the cell phone even while I’m driving’’ from the group-level safety climate scale
was loaded on both the delivery limits factor with k = 0.58 and the cell phone disapproval factor with k = 0.51. However, as the
content of this item is apparently related to the cell phone use while driving, the item was retained in the cell phone disap-
proval factor. The EFA results are presented in Tables 2A and B. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency of the organi-
zation-level safety climate scale and group-level safety climate scale along with factor inter-correlations are shown in
Table 3. Internal consistency statistics of Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .67 to .94 were acceptable.
The 20-item three-factor structures of the organization- and group-level safety climate scales were conﬁrmed by CFAs.
CFAs were conducted ﬁrst for the pilot trucking company (n = 1998). Three different types of factor structures were tested:
(a) correlated three-factor model, (b) overall single-factor model, and (c) the 2nd order hierarchical model including both the
three factors and a single second-order factor above them. The ﬁrst model was based purely on the three-factor solution
from the EFA. Correlations among these three factors were estimated. The second model ruled out the three sub-factors
for parsimony of the construct and assumed that the 20 items loaded on a single overall factor. The ﬁnal model included
the three sub-factors and also an upper-level overall factor hypothesized to cause the three sub-factors. It was based on a
theoretical consideration that safety climate should be able to be represented by various sub-dimensions of the safety cli-
mate. As presented in Table 4, all three CFA models ﬁt the data well. CFIs and TLIs were over 0.95, and RMSEAs were not
greater than 0.10. The correlated three-factor model and the 2nd order hierarchical model equally showed better ﬁt com-
pared to the single-factor model (Dv2 = 679.89 with Ddf = 3 for the organization-level safety climate scale; Dv2 = 1612.30
with Ddf = 3 for the group-level safety climate scale; both were signiﬁcant at p < 0.01). Considering high inter-correlations
among the three factors (0.71–0.84), the 2nd order hierarchical factor model was more appropriate in capturing the nature of
the safety climate measure than the three-factor or overall single-factor models. The results all together indicated that the
best use of the safety climate scale would be with the consideration of the three sub-factors drawn from the EFA that were
closely related to each other and these three sub-factors need to be understood in regard to one general higher factor, safety
climate. The construct validity evidence was also provided by the same CFAs performed with data from eight trucking com-
panies (n = 7466), which included the cases from the pilot company (Table 5). Consistent with the CFAs run with only the
pilot company data, all the different factor models reported acceptable model ﬁt while the best ﬁtting models were both
the correlated three-factor model and the 2nd order hierarchical model.
The ﬁndings from the EFAs and CFAs provided support for the construct validity of the level-speciﬁc organization- and
group-level safety climate scales that take into account safety priority over competing demands.
Table 2A
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) results for organization-level safety climate (OSC) scale (with pilot company data, n = 1998).
Factor
F1 F2 F3
F1: Proactive practices
aX1: Uses any available information to improve existing safety rules .73 .21 .23
aX2: Tries to continually improve safety levels in each department .72 .20 .30
aX3: Invests a lot in safety training for workers .69 .18 .08
X4: Creates programs to improve drivers’ health and wellness (e.g., diet, exercise) .65 .05 .22
aX5: Listens carefully to our ideas about improving safety .65 .06 .47
X6: Cares more about my safety than on-time delivery .64 .32 .20
X7: Allows drivers to change their schedules when they are getting too tired .62 .25 .19
X8: Provides enough hands-on training to help new drivers be safe .62 .06 .34
X9: Gives safety a higher priority compared to other truck companies .62 .29 .04
aX10: Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety concerns .58 .18 .27
aX11: Is strict about working safely when delivery falls behind schedule .55 .39 .17
X12: Gives drivers enough time to deliver loads safely .55 .29 .20
X13: Fixes truck/equipment problems in a timely manner .53 .00 .49
F2: Driver safety priority
X14: Will overlook log discrepancies if I deliver on time .07 .79 .11
X15: Makes it clear that, regardless of safety, I must pick up/deliver on time .19 .71 .06
X16: Expects me to sometimes bend safety rules for important customers .33 .62 .30
X17: Turns a blind eye when we use hand-held cell phones while driving .20 .46 .29
F3: Supervisory care promotion
X18: Assigns too many drivers to each supervisor, making it hard for us to get help .10 .19 .73
X19: Hires supervisors who don’t care about drivers .30 .21 .69
X20: Turns a blind eye when a supervisor bends some safety rules .31 .47 .51
Eigenvalues 8.11 1.43 1.11
Percentage variance 40.55 7.15 5.54
Cumulative variance 40.55 47.70 53.24
Note. All responses for items with negative wordings were reversely coded.
Bolded values indicate factor loadings > 0.40 that are appropriate for a particular factor.
a Generic safety climate scale items for lone workers adopted from Zohar and Luria (2005).
Table 2B
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) results for group-level safety climate (GSC) scale (with pilot company data, n = 1998).
Factor
F1 F2 F3
F1: Safety promotion
aY1: Compliments employees who pay special attention to safety .78 .11 .25
Y2: Provides me with feedback to improve my safety performance .78 .20 .30
Y3: Respects me as a professional driver .75 .36 .00
aY4: Frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work week .74 .05 .36
aY5: Discusses with us how to improve safety .73 .18 .35
aY6: Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely .72 .14 .27
Y7: Is supportive if I ask for help with personal problems or issues .67 .30 .08
Y8: Is an effective mediator/trouble-shooter between the customer and me .67 .33 .10
aY9: Is strict about working safely even when we are tired or stressed .64 .24 .26
Y10: Gives higher priority to my safety than on-time delivery .64 .42 .11
Y11: Would like me to take care of serious equipment problems ﬁrst before delivering .63 .38 .14
Y12: Gives me the freedom to change my schedule when I see safety problems .56 .46 .14
Y13: Makes me feel like I’m bothering him/her when I call .53 .51 .13
F2: Delivery limits
Y14: Encourages us to go faster when deadheading (going for a new load) .12 .76 .17
Y15: Expects me to sometimes bend driving safety rules for important customers .22 .76 .23
Y16: Sometimes turns a blind eye with rules when deliveries fall behind schedule .29 .70 .29
Y17: Pushes me to keep driving even when I call in to say I feel too sick or tired .39 .61 .14
F3: Cell phone disapproval
Y18: Expects me to answer the cell phone even while I’m driving .21 .58 .51
Y19: Stops talking to me on the phone if he/she hears that I am driving .26 .19 .74
Y20: Turns a blind eye when we use hand-held cell phones while driving .16 .47 .62
Eigenvalues 9.71 1.68 1.00
Percentage variance 48.55 8.39 5.02
Cumulative variance 48.55 56.94 61.96
Note. All responses for items with negative wordings were reversely coded.
Bolded values indicate factor loadings > 0.40 that are appropriate for a particular factor.
a Generic safety climate scale items for lone workers adopted from Zohar and Luria (2005). Generic item ‘‘Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls
behind schedule’’ dropped after exploratory factor analysis.
12 Y.-H. Huang et al. / Transportation Research Part F 17 (2013) 5–19
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and internal consistency of the safety climate scale along with factor inter-correlations (with pilot company data, n = 1998).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. OSC factor 1 –
2. OSC factor 2 .55 –
3. OSC factor 3 .62 .54 –
4. Total OSC .96 .73 .76 –
5. GSC factor 1 .70 .45 .58 .71 –
6. GSC factor 2 .55 .61 .52 .63 .66 –
7. GSC factor 3 .46 .53 .43 .54 .58 .65 –
8. Total GSC .70 .55 .61 .74 .97 .80 .73 –
Mean 4.00 4.31 3.68 4.02 4.00 4.44 4.30 4.13
SD .72 .78 .92 .67 .82 .75 .81 .73
Cronbach’s a .90 .68 .67 .92 .94 .81 .73 .94
Note. OSC: Organization-level safety climate. OSC factor 1: Proactive practices. OSC factor 2: Driver safety priority. OSC factor 3: Supervisory care promotion.
GSC: Group-level safety climate. GSC factor 1: Safety promotion. GSC factor 2: Delivery limits. GSC factor 3: Cell phone disapproval. All the correlation
coefﬁcients were statistically signiﬁcant at p < .01.
Table 4
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) results (with pilot company data, n = 1998).
Models Fit indexes
X2 (df) CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI)
A. Organization-level safety climatea
Model 1: Three-factor 1394.80 (167) .99 .99 .062 (.059–.065)
Model 2: One-factor 2074.69 (170) .98 .98 .077 (.074–.080)
Model 3: 2nd order hierarchical 1394.80 (167) .99 .99 .062 (.059–.065)
B. Group-level safety climateb
Model 1: Three-factor 1797.26 (167) .99 .98 .072 (.069–.075)
Model 2: One-factor 3409.56 (170) .97 .97 .100 (.097–.103)
Model 3: 2nd order hierarchical 1797.26 (167) .99 .98 .072 (.069–.075)
a Model 1: a structural model with three factors (proactive practices, driver safety priority, and supervisory care promotion). Model 2: a structural model
with one overall factor for total 20 items. Model 3: a structural model with one overall 2nd order factor of safety climate with three sub-factors (proactive
practices, driver safety priority, and Supervisory care promotion).
b Model 1: a structural model with three factors (safety promotion, delivery limits, and cell phone disapproval). Model 2: a structural model with one
overall factor for total 20 items. Model 3: a structural model with one overall 2nd order factor of safety climate with three sub-factors (safety promotion,
delivery limits, and cell phone disapproval).
Table 5
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) results (with eight trucking companies, n = 7466).
Models Fit indexes
X2 (df) CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI)
A. Organization-level safety climatea
Model 1: Three-factor 4500.90 (167) .99 .99 .059 (.057–.060)
Model 2: One-factor 7621.56 (170) .98 .98 .077 (.075–.078)
Model 3: 2nd order hierarchical 4500.90 (167) .99 .99 .059 (.057–.060)
B. Group-level safety climateb
Model 1: Three-factor 6268.43 (167) .99 .98 .070 (.068–.071)
Model 2: One-factor 12440.72 (170) .97 .97 .098 (.097–.100)
Model 3: 2nd order hierarchical 6268.43 (167) .99 .98 .070 (.068–.071)
a Model 1: a structural model with three factors (proactive practices, driver safety priority, and supervisory care promotion). Model 2: a structural model
with one overall factor for total 20 items. Model 3: a structural model with one overall 2nd order factor of safety climate with three sub-factors (proactive
practices, driver safety priority, and supervisory care promotion).
b Model 1: a structural model with three factors (safety promotion, delivery limits, and cell phone disapproval). Model 2: a structural model with one
overall factor for total 20 items. Model 3: a structural model with one overall 2nd order factor of safety climate with three sub-factors (safety promotion,
delivery limits, and cell phone disapproval).
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Prior to the evaluation of the effect of the safety climate scores on safety behavior and the safety outcome variables, the
level of within-group agreement and between-group variance was examined. For this, rwgj and intra-class correlations ICC(1)
and ICC(2) were calculated based on the pilot company data, which had 66 groups encompassing 1998 truck drivers. The
grouping was made based on a sub-unit of the company, and each group was operationalized by a direct supervisor.
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group-level safety climate scales, respectively, between-group variance did not reach the satisfactory level for ICC(1) ranging
from 0.02 to 0.06 and ICC(2) ranging from 0.12 to 0.36 (see Table 6). Considering that the generally accepted criteria for
ICC(1) and ICC(2) are, respectively, greater than 0.10 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008; Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993) and greater than
0.70 (Bliese, 2000), the results failed to justify the aggregation of individual/psychological safety climate scores to form
shared safety climate perception for their work groups.
One more company (company B in Table 6) provided information for grouping based on work units. A similar pattern was
observed for the data. Median rwgj values were 0.93 for both organization- and group-level safety climates. ICC(1) ranged
from 0.03 to 0.08 while ICC(2) ranged from 0.27 to 0.50, suggesting the between-group variance was not enough to create
group/unit-level aggression data. Therefore, the following analyses were based on individual/psychological safety climate
scores instead of aggregated shared safety climate perception scores of the work units.
Although there was a lack of reliability within work unit-level (based on supervisor group), shared safety climate percep-
tion was observed at the company as the unit for all eight companies with median rwgj = 0.89 and 0.88, ICC(1) = 0.12 and 0.11,
and ICC(2) = 0.99 and 0.99, respectively, for the organization- and group-level safety climate scores. Since the number of par-
ticipating companies was limited (n = 8), no shared safety climate perceptions for the companies were aggregated for further
analyses.
3.3. Criterion-related validity
3.3.1. Overall safety climate scores and safety behavior
For the following analyses, aimed at testing the predictive validity of the newly developed organization- and group-level
safety climate scales, the data collected from all eight trucking companies (n = 7466) that participated in this study were
used for the regression analyses. The regression analyses showed that the overall scores of organization- and group-level
safety climate (20 items each) were all signiﬁcantly related to self-reported driving safety behavior with B = 0.37
(SE = 0.01, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.35, 0.38], p < 0.01) and 0.33 (SE = 0.01, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.32, 0.35],
p < 0.01), respectively. R2 statistics showed that the organization-level safety climate score explained 19% of the variance
for driving safety behavior while the group-level safety climate score accounted for 20% of the variance (Table 7).
3.3.2. Overall safety climate scores and objective safety performance measures
For the generalized linear modeling (GLM) analyses, data from ﬁve companies that provided the road injury variable
(n = 5534) were used. According to the GLM analyses, the organization- and group-level safety climate scores also signiﬁ-
cantly predicted road injury with B = 0.56 (SE = 0.03, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.61, 0.50], Wald v2 = 380.49,Table 6
Shared safety climate perception examination for pilot company and one additional company.
rwgj
a ICC(1) ICC(2) ANOVA (F)
A. Company 1 (pilot company, n = 1998)
1. OSC factor 1 .93 (.00–1.00) .02 .16 1.19
2. OSC factor 2 .77 (.00–1.00) .02 .12 1.13
3. OSC factor 3 .63 (.00–1.00) .02 .14 1.16
4. Total OSC .94 (100–1.00) .02 .16 1.19
5. GSC factor 1 .93 (.00–1.00) .03 .22 1.28*
6. GSC factor 2 .87 (.00–1.00) .04 .25 1.34**
7. GSC factor 3 .79 (.00–1.00) .06 .36 1.56*
8. Total GSC .95 (.00–1.00) .04 .23 1.30*
B. Company 2 (n = 2620)
1. OSC factor 1 .91 (.00–1.00) .04 .32 1.47**
2. OSC factor 2 .69 (.00–1.00) .03 .27 1.38**
3. OSC factor 3 .52 (.00–1.00) .04 .34 1.52**
4. Total OSC .93 (.00–1.00) .04 .33 1.48**
5. GSC factor 1 .90 (.00–1.00) .07 47 1.88**
6. GSC factor 2 .82 (.00–1.00) .05 .40 1.66**
7. GSC factor 3 .75 (.00–1.00) .08 .50 1.99**
8. Total GSC .93 (.00–1.00) .07 .48 1.94**
Note. OSC: Organization-level safety climate. OSC factor 1: Proactive practices. OSC factor 2: Driver safety priority. OSC factor 3: Supervisory care promotion.
GSC: Group-level safety climate. GSC factor 1: Safety promotion. GSC factor 2: Delivery limits. GSC factor 3: Cell phone disapproval. Criteria for acceptable
homogeneity tests are the following: a median of rwgj > .70 (James et al., 1993); ICC(1) > .10 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008; Murphy & Myors, 1998; Ostroff &
Schmitt, 1993) and ICC(2) > .70 (Bliese, 2000; LeBreton & Senter, 2008).
a rwgj statistics are mean values with ranges within bracket.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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These ﬁndings indicate that, as the raw score of organization-level safety climate increases from 1 to 5, the overall number of
lost days due to road injury would drop from 2.01 to 0.02 days. For the group-level safety climate scale, as the raw score
increases from 1 to 5, the number of lost days would decrease from 1.61 to 0.25 days.
One company provided the frequency of hard-braking information for their employees (n = 3233). The variable was re-
gressed by GLM with the organization- and group-level safety climate scale scores. The overall organization-level safety cli-
mate score could predict the hard-braking variable signiﬁcantly (intercept = 0.68, B = 0.08, SE = 0.02, 95% conﬁdence
interval: [0.13, 0.04], p < .01) while the overall group-level safety climate score could not (intercept = 0.45, B = 0.02,
SE = 0.02, 95% conﬁdence interval: [0.06, 0.02], p = 0.25). However, when the driving safety behavior variable was included
as a mediator, both organization- and group-level safety climate had signiﬁcant indirect effects on the hard-braking fre-
quency with coefﬁcients 0.02 (SE = 0.01, 95% conﬁdence interval: [0.03, 0.08  102], p < 0.05) and 0.01 (SE = 0.01,
95% conﬁdence interval: [0.02, 0.05  102], p < 0.05), respectively. These ﬁndings supported the predictive validity of
the safety climate scales. In summary, criterion-related validity of the developed safety scales was supported.
3.3.3. Incremental predictive validity of the trucking industry-speciﬁc items
With an attempt to examine the value of including industry-speciﬁc items in addition to generic items in terms of crite-
rion-related validity, the previous regression and GLM analyses were repeated separately for the generic items and the full
safety climate scales, which included both the generic and industry-speciﬁc items. To test multiple-predictor models with
the regression and GLM analyses, mean centered variables were used to reduce the effect of multicollinearity caused by high
correlation between the two predictors (i.e., the generic item scores and the full safety climate scales).
The regression analyses showed that the generic items of the organization- and group-level safety climate scales could
independently predict driving safety behavior signiﬁcantly with B = 0.28 (SE = 0.01, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.26, 0.29],
p < 0.01) and 0.22 (SE = 0.01, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.20, 0.23], p < 0.01), respectively (Table 7). When the driving safety
behavior was regressed on both the generic item score and the full safety climate scale together, only the full safety climate
scale was a signiﬁcant predictor with a positive coefﬁcient. Although the score from only the generic items was a signiﬁcant
predictor in the multiple regression, it negatively predicted driving safety behavior, which was contrary to the simple regres-
sion in which the driving safety behavior was regressed by the score from the generic items independently. The organiza-
tion-level generic items accounted for 14% of the dependent variable variance (B = 0.11, SE = 0.02, 95% conﬁdence
interval = [0.15, 0.07], p < 0.01), while the full organization-level safety climate scale could explain an additional 6% of
the variance (B = 0.48, SE = 0.02, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.44, 0.52], p < 0.01), with total R2 = 0.20. Ten percent of the
dependent variable variance could be accounted for by the group-level generic item score (B = 0.17, SE = 0.01, 95% conﬁ-
dence interval = [0.20, 0.14], p < 0.01), while an additional 11% of the variance could be explained by the full
(generic + industry-speciﬁc items) group-level safety climate scale (B = 0.49, SE = 0.02, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.46,
0.52], p < 0.01), with total R2 = 0.21.
Results from the GLM are presented in Table 8. In the single-predictor models, scores from only the generic items could
predict road injury signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01). Unstandardized coefﬁcient B values of the generic item scores for the organiza-
tion- and group-level safety climate scales were, respectively, 0.31 (SE = 0.03, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.36, 0.26],
Wald v2 = 149.75) and 0.21 (SE = 0.02, 95% conﬁdence interval = [0.26, 0.17], Wald v2 = 79.56). However, in the multi-
ple-predictor models, which included both the score from generic items and the score from the full safety climate scale
(generic + industry-speciﬁc items) together to predict road injury, only the full safety climate scale showed a signiﬁcantTable 7
Regression analyses in prediction of self-report driving safety behavior with total organization-level safety climate (OSC) and group-level safety climate (GSC)
scores and their generic item scores and full safety climate scale scores (n = 7466 from all eight companies).
DV: driving safety R2 Intercept (SE) Ba (SE) 95% CI
Lower Upper
Simple regression
OSC generic items .14 3.27 (.03) .28 (.01) .26 .29
Full OSC .19 2.92 (.04) .37 (.01) .35 .38
GSC generic items .10 3.56 (.03) .22 (.01) .20 .23
Full GSC .20 3.04 (.03) .33 (.01) .32 .35
Multiple regression
OSC generic items .14 – .11 (.02) .15 .07
Full OSC .06 – .48 (.02) .44 .52
(OSC generic items + Full OSC) .20 4.36 (.01) – – –
GSC generic items .10 – .17 (.01) .20 .14
Full GSC .11 – .49 (.02) .46 .52
(GSC generic items + Full GSC) .21 4.36 (.01) – – –
Note. OSC: Organization-level safety climate. GSC: Group-level safety climate.
a All B values were statistically signiﬁcant at p < .01.
Table 8
Generalized linear modeling with Poisson log-link function results in prediction of road injury (lost working days) with the generic item score and full
organization-level safety climate (OSC) scale and group-level safety climate (GSC) scale (n = 5534 from ﬁve companies that provided injury information).
DV: road injury Intercept (SE) Ba (SE) 95% CI Wald v2
Lower Upper
Single-predictor model
OSC generic items .35 (.10) .31 (.03) .36 .26 149.75
Full OSC 1.28 (.11) .56 (.03) .61 .50 380.49
GSC generic items .09 (.09) .21 (.02) .26 .17 79.56
Full GSC .94 (.10) .46 (.02) .51 .41 346.85
Multiple-predictor model
OSC generic items – .67 (.06) .56 .78 141.73
Full OSC – 1.25 (.06) 1.37 1.12 379
(OSC generic items + Full OSC) .92 (.02) – – – –
GSC generic items – .58 (.05) .49 .67 157.25
Full GSC – 1.00 (.05) 1.09 .90 413.67
(GSC generic items + Full GSC) .93 (.02) – – – –
Note. OSC: Organization-level safety climate. GSC: Group-level safety climate.
a All B values were statistically signiﬁcant at p < .01.
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0.78], Wald v2 = 378.49) and 0.73 (SE = 0.04, 95% CI = [0.80, 0.65], Wald v2 = 354.47), respectively, for the organiza-
tion- and group-level scales. The generic item scores had positive B statistics in the prediction of the road injury variable
when the effect of the full safety climate scale on the road injury variable was controlled for, even when signiﬁcant. It
was contrary to the negative B statistics of the generic item scores in the single-predictor GLM models.
The predictive directions of the generic item scores for driving safety and road injury were reversed after the full safety
climate scales’ effects were ruled out. This suggested a multicollinearity problem, as expected. High correlations were ob-
served between the generic item score and full safety climate scale with r = 0.91 and 0.86 (both were signiﬁcant at
p < 0.01), respectively, for the organization- and group-level safety climate scales. These ﬁndings showed that the generic
items and the full safety climate scales have a large common portion in the prediction of driving safety behavior and road
injury, with the full safety climate scales that included items speciﬁcally tailored to the trucking industry demonstrating
stronger predictive validity. Criterion-related validity testing results supported the overall predictive utility of the safety cli-
mate scales and also showed the signiﬁcant incremental predictive validity of the industry-speciﬁc items over the generic
items.
4. Discussion
The ﬁrst objective of this study was to develop and test the reliability and validity of a new scale designed for measuring
safety climate among lone workers, using truck drivers as exemplar. The new scale employs perceived safety priority as the
metric of safety climate. Furthermore, it employs a multi-level framework, separating the measurement of organization- and
group-level safety climate by differentiating items into two sub-scales. The second objective of this study was to compare
the predictive power of generic items with industry-speciﬁc ones, constituting the new Trucking Safety Climate scale.
Results showed that three-factor solutions drawn from EFAs and CFAs conﬁrmed the organization- and group-level safety
climate scales’ construct validity. A series of homogeneity testing did not reveal a shared perception unique to work unit, but
organization-level shared perception was observed for these eight participating companies. Criterion-related validity of the
safety climate scales in terms of the relationship between safety climate scores and driving safety behavior/road injury was
supported by regression and GLM analyses. These ﬁndings were consistent with previous studies such as Grifﬁn and Neal
(2000), Mueller, DaSilva, Townsend, and Tetrick (1999), and Zohar (2003).
This study has several theoretical and practical implications. First of all, a safety climate measurement tool suited for the
trucking/transportation industry had not been introduced before the current study. Also, the focus of this study was placed
on the trucking industry where safety issues, such as high accident rates, need to be addressed. The target participants in-
cluded in the study were mobile lone workers who drive trucks for long periods of time away from home, with a lack of face-
to-face supervisory oversight. Safety climate can be very important for this unique population because safety climate can act
as a frame of reference that guides normative safety behavior, such that employees develop coherent sets of perceptions and
expectations regarding safety behavior-outcome contingencies. Employees, thus, behave accordingly when strong safety cli-
mate exists, even in lone working situations. Furthermore, the ﬁndings from this study consistently showed that safety cli-
mate can be a strong indicator of safe driving behavior and objective safety outcomes in the trucking industry.
Second, this study provided ample empirical evidence to support the theoretical suggestions from Zohar (2008, 2010).
This study highlighted two different levels of perception regarding safety climate in the trucking industry, which led to
the development of the organization- and group-level safety climate scales. This is closely related to the process of safety
Y.-H. Huang et al. / Transportation Research Part F 17 (2013) 5–19 17climate formation and transfer from organizational level to individual employee level via work group. In this regard, future
studies about safety climate in the trucking industry would beneﬁt from the use of the newly developed level-speciﬁc safety
climate scales. Moreover, these safety climate scales include items regarding safety priority over competing operational and
safety demands. Speciﬁcally, the driver safety priority and supervisory care promotion factors from the organization-level
safety climate scale and the delivery limits and cell phone disapproval factors from the group-level safety climate scale items
were, for the most part, about priority issues, such as safety over-time, productivity, and supervisory oversight.
As Zohar (2010) suggested, development of industry-speciﬁc climate scales should be encouraged as it is likely to identify
new, context-dependent targets of climate perception in respective industries. In the current study, a reliable and valid
safety climate scale speciﬁc for the trucking industry was developed. The industry-speciﬁc scales incorporate various factors
and items pertaining to the trucking industry, which could be used among trucking companies to showwhere improvements
can be made and, as such, may offer a valuable starting point for future safety interventions and have actionable plan.
Christian et al. (2009) categorized safety climate perceptions into two levels of analysis, resulting in shared group-level
safety climate and individual/psychological safety climate. Our study results showed that for lone workers, individual/psy-
chological safety climate perceptions were signiﬁcant predictors for safety outcomes; however, there were no shared safety
climate perceptions among working groups. As lone workers generally lack the opportunity to interact with other co-work-
ers, so it is reasonable that there were no shared safety climate perceptions among working groups. A chance to talk together
is important for symbolic interaction (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar, 2010) in order to form group consensus, which
places the focus on meanings that arise within the interactions between people. This suggests that companies may consider
providing more opportunity for verbal communication and other interaction behaviors between lone workers and other
employees (e.g., more frequent group meetings, using technology to increase communication) in order to form shared safety
climate perception among groups.
This study also investigated the relationship between safety climate scores and an objective safety outcome variable, the
number of lost working days due to injury measured 6 months after the scale implementation, and clearly reconﬁrmed pre-
vious ﬁndings about the organizational effect of safety climate on safety outcomes (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009;
Nahrgang et al., 2011). The organization- and group-level safety climate scores can be a valid indicator not only for driving
safety behavior but also for future road injury in the trucking industry. The implementation of the safety climate scales,
which assess multiple dimensions unique to organization and group levels, would provide managers and employees with
rich feedback regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses in safety policies and practice in their particular company.
Finally, the large sample size and objective performance metrics used in this study strengthened the psychometric prop-
erty and utility of the newly developed safety climate scales. The sample size of over 7000 mobile lone workers from major
trucking companies enhanced not only the uniqueness of the study population but also the sound reliability and external
validity of this study.
There are several potential limitations as well. Regardless of the fairly large sample size, the number of trucking compa-
nies that participated in this study was only eight. The ﬁndings from eight trucking companies may not be exactly consistent
across many other companies that were not included in this study because different trucking companies are likely to have
different managerial styles, attitudes toward safety issues, and levels of quality of the supervisor–employee relationship.
Also, truck drivers’ job experience and average distance of daily driving may vary across different companies. Hence, a selec-
tion bias could have affected the results as some trucking companies who were asked but did not participate in the study
may have had poor safety records and felt reluctant to participate. Future studies should diversify the sampling sources
by including more companies with different organizational conditions to ensure the reliability of the Trucking Safety Climate
scale scores and predictive validity.
In conclusion, the present study showed that even though truck drivers work alone, they are able to perceive the safety
priorities of their companies, and these perceptions can be used to predict safe working behavior and actual injury outcomes.
It is expected that the development and validation of organization- and group-level safety climate scales speciﬁc to the
trucking industry would contribute to future studies about safety climate and safety outcomes in the trucking industry.Acknowledgements
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